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Abstract: This paper finds that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is positively 
associated with bank insolvency risk, as proxied by the Z-score and the Merton’s distance 
to default measure, for an international sample of banks over the 2004-2008 period. 
Banks are special in that ‘good’ corporate governance increases bank insolvency risk 
relatively more for banks that are large and located in countries with sound public 
finances, as banks aim to exploit the financial safety net. ‘Good’ corporate governance is 
specifically associated with higher asset volatility, more non-performing loans, and a 
lower tangible capital ratio. Furthermore, ‘good’ corporate governance is associated with 
more bank risk taking at times of rapid economic expansion. Consistent with increased 
risk-taking, ‘good’ corporate governance is associated with a higher valuation of the 
implicit insurance provided by the financial safety net, especially in the case of large 
banks. These results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-
fail policies in encouraging excessive risk-taking by banks. 
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Corporate managers may be more risk averse than shareholders, as corporate 
bankruptcy generally causes managers to lose their jobs, part of their personal wealth and 
their reputation. ‘Good’ corporate governance - promoting the interests of shareholders – 
may serve to counteract managers’ bias against risk taking. In line with this, John, Litov, 
and Young (2008) find that ‘better’ corporate governance represented in the form of 
stronger investor protection brings about increased risk-taking and higher growth for an 
international sample of non-financial firms.  
 For financial institutions, the calculus regarding the optimal degree of risk taking 
is different than for non-financial firms, as banks tend to be supported by the financial 
safety net if they become distressed. Banks, in particular, benefit from deposit insurance 
and may receive generous public support to prevent their failure. The financial safety 
provides banks with an incentive to take on excessive risks in order to increase the value 
of these benefits. Hence, the financial safety net is expected to affect the association 
between risk taking and corporate governance (see for example, Laeven, 2013).  Large 
banks may benefit relatively more from the financial safety net, as they may be deemed 
too big to fail by regulators (see Acharya, Anginer and Warburton 2014, , and Bertay, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2013). For this reason, shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance may increase risk taking more in the case of large banks. Similarly, a 
country’s financial safety net is more credible if it has sound public finances (Acharya, 
Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2013, and Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2013). Therefore, 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance is likely to increase bank risk taking especially 
in fiscally strong countries.  
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 This paper empirically examines the relationships between bank risk taking and 
corporate governance for an international sample of banks from 22 countries over the 
2004-2008 period.  Following Aggarwal et al. (2009), we use an overall index of the 
shareholder-friendliness of corporate governance, and subindices dealing with board 
composition, compensation, auditing and takeover-related issues, based on data from 
Institutional Shareholder Services. 
 We find that a bank’s insolvency risk, proxied by its Z-score or market-based 
distance to default, is positively associated with the overall index of the shareholder-
friendliness of its corporate governance. The positive relationships between overall bank 
risk and different measures of corporate governance are robust to instrumental variables 
estimation, where, as instruments we use the annual country-mean values of the corporate 
governance variables over all banks after excluding the pertinent bank. 
 Furthermore, we find that bank insolvency riskis positively associated with the 
shareholder-friendliness of a bank’s corporate governance especially for large banks and 
for banks located in fiscally sound countries. These results are consistent with the view 
that shareholder-friendly corporate governance increases bank risk more if the additional 
bank risk significantly increases a bank’s contingent claim on the financial safety net.  
 Going beyond measures of insolvency risk, we also examine the ‘channels’ 
through which a bank takes on more risk, if it has more shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance. On the asset side, we find that asset volatility derived from Merton’s option 
pricing model, and the share of non-performing loans in total loans, are positively related 
to ‘good’ corporate governance. On the liability side, we find a negative relationship 
between a bank’s tangible equity ratio and the corporate governance index.  
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 Our results also suggest that corporate governance affects the relationship 
between bank risk taking and the business cycle. Specifically, lending at banks with more 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance is more procyclical as such banks may care 
less about the riskiness of expanding credit at the height of the business cycle. In addition, 
we find that banks with ‘good’ corporate governance report less non-performing loans at 
times of high economic growth. This suggests that banks with ‘good’ corporate 
governance bias their reporting of non-performing loans downward during periods of 
rapid economic expansion so as to preserve capital to be able to continue to increase 
credit. Similarly, we see that banks with ‘good’ corporate governance have relatively low 
tangible capital ratios when the economy grows rapidly. 
 The higher bank risk associated with shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
should benefit banks to the extent that this increases the valuation of the implicit 
insurance provided by the financial safety net. As an extension, we examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and the estimated value of the implicit 
insurance provided by the financial safety net. We find that shareholder-friendly 
corporate governance is associated with a higher value of the implicit insurance, 
especially for large banks. This is consistent with the notion that large banks have an 
incentive to increase the value of the implicit insurance by increasing their risk, since 
their too-large-to-fail status increases their chances of collecting on this insurance.  
 Our study fits in an emerging literature that has addressed the impact of corporate 
governance on bank risk taking.
2
 Pathan (2009) finds that small boards and boards that 
are not controlled by the CEO lead to additional bank risk as reflected in market 
measures of risk and the Z-score for a sample of US bank holding companies over the 
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1997-2004 period. Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006), in turn, find a positive impact of 
option-based executive compensation and wealth on market measures of risk for a sample 
of US commercial banks during the period 1992-2000.  DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2013) 
further find that CEO risk-taking incentives lead to riskier business policy decisions 
(regarding loans to businesses, non-interest based banking activities, and investment in 
mortgage-backed securities) at US commercial banks over the 1994-2006 period, 
especially in the second half of the sample period after deregulation and for the largest 
banks. Calomiris and Carlson (2014) examine bank ownership and risk-taking at US 
banks in the 1890s, finding that higher managerial ownership is associated with lower 
bank default risk.  
Several papers have also examined how banks with different corporate 
governance regimes fared during the crisis, with mixed results. Berger, Bjorn, and Rauch 
(2012) find that high shareholdings of outside directors and chief officers imply a 
substantially lower probability of bank failure for US commercial banks over the 2007-
2010 period. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find some evidence that US banks with CEOs 
whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders in 2006 had worse 
share price performance during the subsequent crisis. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) report 
that US bank holding companies that had a strong and independent risk management 
function in place before the onset of the financial crisis fared better in terms of operating 
and stock performance during the crisis.  
However, multi-country studies of bank corporate governance and risk taking are 
relatively scarce.  Laeven and Levine (2009) examine the relationship between bank 
ownership and bank risk taking for an international sample of banks. They find that 
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greater cash flow rights of large owners are associated with greater bank risk, consistent 
with the hypothesis that bank shareholders favor risk-taking relative to managers and 
creditors. These authors also consider the interaction between bank regulation and 
ownership, finding that deposit insurance is associated with an increase in risk only when 
the bank has a large equity holder.  More recently, using international data, Erkens, Hung, 
and Matos (2012) find that financial institutions with more independent boards and 
higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the global financial 
crisis. 
Our contribution to this literature is three-fold.  First, we use international bank-
level data for 22 countries to study the association between bank risk and corporate 
governance, adding to a literature which has mostly relied on US data.  Second, using 
multi-country data allows us to exploit differences across country safety-nets to study 
how the relationship between bank risk-taking and corporate governance varies with the 
generosity and credibility of the safety net and banks’ ability to engage in risk-shifting. 
Third, we are able to study how banks increase their risk-taking with more share-holder 
friendly corporate governance, identifying increased asset risk, reduced capitalization, 
and the pursuit of more pro-cyclical lending policies as potential channels.   
Overall, our findings on the interaction of bank-level corporate governance 
variables and the financial safety net has important implications for corporate governance 
reforms in the banking sector, as policy makers question the extent to which governance 
failures have contributed to excessive risk taking and  financial instability. In particular, 
our results suggest that one has to be cautious to call for ‘better’ corporate governance at 
banks as long as generous financial safety nets and too-big-to-fail policies are in place, as 
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this may actually induce banks to take on more risk with potentially negative 
repercussions for the stability of the financial system.  
In the remainder, section 2 discusses the data, and section 3 presents the empirical 
results. Section 3 starts with an analysis of the relationships between corporate 
governance and overall bank insolvency risk and bank returns. Then it considers the 
‘channels’ on the assets and liabilities sides of the bank’s balance sheet through which 
corporate governance affects overall bank risk. Finally, it considers the relationship 
between corporate governance and bank risk taking over the business cycle. Section 4 
concludes with policy implications. 
 
     2. The data 
In this study, we relate measures of bank risk to summary indicators of corporate 
governance for an international sample of banks over the 2004-2008 period. Accounting 
and market data necessary to construct our bank risk measures are taken from Bankscope 
of Bureau Van Dijk, CRSP and Compustat Global. Data on bank corporate governance 
are from the Corporate Governance Quotient data base assembled by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS).  
We examine two main measures of bank insolvency risk. First, the Z-score represents 
the number of standard deviations that a bank’s rate of return on assets has to fall for the 
bank to become insolvent. The Z-score is constructed as the sum of the rate of return on 
assets and the equity to assets ratio divided by the standard deviation of the return on 
assets. Table A1 in the Appendix describes variable definitions and data sources. A 
higher Z-score signals that a bank has lower insolvency risk. We calculate a Z-score for a 
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bank, if at least three annual observations of its rate of return on assets are available. 
Second, the distance to default measures the difference between the asset value of the 
bank and the face value its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the bank’s asset 
value (see Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008, p. 2899). The distance to default 
variable is computed as an annual average of weekly values (see the Appendix for details 
on how the distance to default is estimated). 
Next, we collect several variables to capture different aspects of a bank’s overall risk 
strategy. These variables reflect a bank’s asset allocation and income mix strategies, its 
capitalization and funding strategies, and its overall asset growth strategy. 
To start, asset volatility is the annualized standard deviation of the asset returns 
computed from the Merton’s option pricing model.  The asset volatility variable has mean 
of 0.048.Asset risk weight is an indicator of the average riskiness of a bank’s assets, and 
is computed as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets, using the risk weights as 
defined in the Basle capital adequacy framework.  Lower values of asset risk weight 
indicate less risky assets. The asset risk weight variable has a mean of 0.70. 
Bank loans are generally riskier than other investments, such as holdings of 
government securities. We use the loans variable, computed as the ratio of loans to total 
assets, as a proxy for asset risk. The loans variable has a mean of 70.3%. 
The non-performing loans variable, computed as the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans, is an index of loan quality. On average, 1.2% of loans are non-performing. 
A bank’s asset allocation affects the composition of its income which generally can 
include interest income, fees, commissions and trading income. The fee income variable, 
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constructed as the ratio of net interest income to total operating income, is an index of the 
riskiness of a bank’s income.  It has a mean of 0.30.  
Turning to bank capitalization, we can divide a bank’s common equity into tangible 
common equity and non-tangible common equity. The latter category includes tax 
deferred assets and mortgage servicing rights, which are capital categories with only 
limited loss absorption capacity. Excluding these, we construct the tangible capital ratio 
as the ratio of tangible equity divided by tangible assets (i.e., total assets minus non-
tangible assets). The tangible equity ratio has a mean of 7.8%. 
A bank’s short-term funding comprises customer and other deposits and non-deposits 
such as short-term borrowing in the interbank market. The non-deposit funding variable, 
computed as the share of non-deposit, short-term funding in total short-term funding, is 
an index of the riskiness of a bank’s short-term funding. It has a mean of 0.17. 
High bank asset growth may signal higher bank risk, as a bank may only be able to 
grow fast by investing in riskier assets, for instance by lending to riskier loan customers. 
Our asset growth variable is the growth rate of total assets, with a mean value of 7.5%.  
In addition, banks with highly procyclical lending may be more risky, as such banks 
may be overly optimistic about their customers’ creditworthiness at the peak of the 
business cycle. We construct the lending procyclicality variable as the correlation 
between a bank’s loan growth rate and the GDP growth rate. The mean lending 
procyclicality variable is 0.10. 
Bank risk is beneficial to the banks to the extent that it increases the value of their 
contingent claim on the financial safety net. As an indicator of this, we consider the fair 
value of the implicit insurance of a bank’s liabilities provided by the financial safety net. 
10 
 
Following Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven (2003) and Bushman and Williams (2012), we 
construct the IPP variable as the estimated fair-value insurance premium of a dollar of 
bank liabilities expressed in cents (see the Appendix for details). 
Our corporate governance variables are indices that summarize extensive information 
on detailed governance attributes that are indicative of increased power of minority 
shareholders. We use the indices as formulated by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2009) based on individual governance attributes assembled by Institutional Shareholder 
Services. The individual attributes are dummy variables that take on a value of 1 if the 
characteristic is relatively shareholder-friendly, and a value of zero otherwise. An overall 
index, called corporate governance, summarizes information on 44 attributes. In addition, 
there are four sub-indices, called board, compensation and ownership, auditing and 
takeover that summarize information on 25, 10, 3 and 6 attributes related to these various 
aspects of corporate governance, respectively. The takeover sub-index, for instance, has a 
higher score, if there are fewer corporate governance-related barriers to takeovers. A 
listing of the individual attributes that are represented by the overall index, and the four 
sub-indices, is provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. This detailed information on 
corporate governance is available for banks located in 22 countries. For the country 
coverage, see Table A3 in the Appendix. 
Table 2 displays information on the correlations among the overall corporate 
governance index and the four sub-indices. Not surprisingly, the overall index is positive 
and significantly correlated to the four sub-indices. The correlation between the overall 
index and the board index is high at 0.91, which no doubt reflects 25 attributes in the 
overall index (out of 44) are board attributes. Correlations among the four sub-indices are 
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positive and significant, with the exception that the takeover index is negatively 
correlated with the other three sub-indices (and significantly in the case of the 
compensation and ownership, and auditing indices). Apparently, corporate governance 
regimes at banks that are relatively shareholder friendly in terms of posing few takeover 
barriers are less shareholder-friendly in other respects.  
Overall corporate governance has become more shareholder-friendly over the 2003-
2007 period. As seen in Figure 1, Part A, the overall index increased from 23.31 in 2003 
to 26.45 in 2007 for US banks in part due to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.  It increased from 24.36 to 24.75 for non-US banks. These differential trends in 
corporate governance for US and non-US banks (and, therefore, also for individual banks) 
allows us to estimate relationships between bank risk variables and corporate governance 
in specifications that include bank fixed effects. Figure 1, Parts  B-E provide time trends 
for the four sub-indices related to board, compensation and ownership, auditing, and 
takeover attributes, respectively. Part A shows that board characteristics became 
materially more shareholder-friendly for US banks, but only slightly so for non-US banks. 
In Part B, we see that the sub-index related to compensation and ownership increased 
about equally for US and non-US banks. The auditing subindex, in turn, went up for US 
banks, and declined for non-US banks, as seen in Part C. Finally, the takeover sub-index 
increased about the same for US banks and non-US banks, as evident in Part C of the 
figure. 
In the analysis, we use several bank-level control variables. The assets variable, 
constructed as the log of a bank’s total assets, proxies for the bank’s absolute size. As an 
alternative index of absolute size, the Big bank variable is a dummy variable that signals 
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a bank with total assets exceeding 50 billion dollars. In addition, the assets to GDP 
variable, or total bank assets divided by GDP, represents the bank’s size relative to the 
national economy. Larger banks may pursue riskier banking strategies, if they are 
considered to be too big to fail. The overhead variable is constructed as overhead 
expenses divided by total assets. Inefficient banks with large overhead expenses may 
choose relatively risky bank strategies to maintain a certain expected return on assets. 
Finally, the collateral variable is the ratio of assets that can be easily used as collateral 
divided by total assets. Banks with assets that can be used as collateral may find it easier 
to pursue risky banking strategies, as their financial costs may be less sensitive to overall 
bank risk.  
Finally, we include several macroeconomic and country-level institutional control 
variables. Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the rate of real 
GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. 
Fiscal balance represents the government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. The 
variable restrict is a composite index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities from 
Barth et al. (2004). Specifically, it is an indicator of the degree to which banks face 
regulatory restrictions on their activities in securities markets, insurance, real estate, and 
owning shares in non-financial firms.  It ranges from 0 to 4 with higher values indicating 
greater restrictions. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, 
summarizing information about the nature and the magnitude of bank capital 
requirements, with higher values indicating greater diversification. Official is an index of 
the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency to undertake specific actions to 
prevent and correct problems at a bank, with higher values indicating greater power. 
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Diversification is an index of loan diversification guidelines imposed on banks. Finally, 
financial freedom is an index of financial market freedoms from the Heritage Foundation.  
  
3. Empirical results 
A. Bank insolvency risk and corporate governance  
Table 3 considers the relationships between corporate governance indices on the 
one hand and the Z-score and the distance to default as proxies for bank insolvency risk 
on the other.
3
 The regressions include bank and year fixed effects, and errors are 
clustered at the bank level. All independent variables are lagged one year to reduce 
endogeneity concerns. 
In regression (1), where Z-score is the dependent variable, the overall corporate 
governance index has a negative coefficient -0.027 that is significant at the 5% level, 
suggesting that more shareholder-friendly corporate governance increases bank 
insolvency risk. Among the controls, we find that the Z-score is negatively and 
significantly related to the assets and assets to GDP variables, indicating that larger 
absolute and relative bank size are associated with higher bank insolvency risk. This 
suggests that larger banks take on more risk as they benefit from a too-big-to-fail status. 
The Z-score is also negatively and significantly related to GDP per capita. This result 
may reflect the fact that banks in wealthier countries benefit from a more credible 
financial safety net, which allows them to take on more risk. Furthermore, the Z-score is 
                                                          
3
 We also considered the relationships between a bank’s return on assets and its return on equity with 
corporate governance.  The relationship between a bank’s return on assets and the overall corporate 
governance index is estimated to be negative and significant at 10 percent (unreported). This negative 
relationship possibly reflects that the 2004-2008 sample period includes a major financial crisis. 
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negatively and significantly related to the diversification variable, suggesting that 
guidelines promoting diversification contribute to bank safety. 
In regression 2, we replace the overall corporate governance index by the four 
subindices. In this regression, the board subindex has a negative coefficient that is 
significant at 5%, while the compensation and ownership, auditing and takeover indices 
have insignificant coefficients. Thus, a more shareholder-friendly board is found to be 
associated with higher bank insolvency risk. 
In regressions 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the distance to default measure. 
Otherwise,  
these regressions are analogous to regressions 1 and 2. In regression 3, the overall 
corporate governance index is estimated with a negative coefficient that is significant at 
5%.  Iin regression 4 the board index has a negative coefficient that is also significant at 
5%. This is further evidence that a bank’s insolvency risk is positively associated with 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance. 
 Bigger banks may be riskier, because they expect to receive a more generous 
treatment by bank regulators in case of insolvency on account of their too-big-to-fail 
status. Hence the positive relationship between bank risk and good corporate governance 
may be driven by the larger banks in the sample. To see whether the relationship between 
bank insolvency risk and corporate governance depends on bank size, we include 
interaction terms between the corporate governance variables and the assets variable in 
the regressions of Table 3. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 4. The results are 
particularly stark for distance to default regressions in 3 and 4. While the overall 
corporate governance index and its components have positive and significant coefficients 
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in the regressions, indicating that “good” corporate governance is associated with a 
reduction in risk-taking, the interaction terms of the overall index and board and 
compensation and ownership variables with bank size have negative and significant 
coefficients. In Panel B of Table 4, we replace the assets variable as an index of absolute 
bank size by the big bank dummy.  The results are similar to those using absolute size.  
We find negative coefficients for the interactions of the big bank variable with the overall 
corporate governance variable and the board and compensation and ownership subindices 
in regressions 3 and 4. Overall, these results suggest that the adverse effects of good 
corporate governance on bank risk-taking are more important for larger banks that are 
able to shift their risk onto the safety net. 
To further investigate risk-shifting by larger banks, we also examine how the impact 
of corporate governance on bank risk varies with the credibility of the safety net.  
Countries with strong finances are more likely to be able to bail out distressed banks that 
are deemed too big to fail. Thus banks with shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
may have higher insolvency risk if they are located in countries with a high fiscal balance 
relative to GDP.
4
 To examine this, we estimate regressions interacting the fiscal balance-
to-GDP ratio with corporate governance indices. The results are reported in in Panel A of 
Table 5. In the distance to default regression 3, the overall corporate governance index 
and its interaction with the fiscal balance both have negative and significant coefficients. 
Similarly, the distance to default is negatively and significantly related to the 
compensation and ownership variables and their interaction with the fiscal balance in 
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regression 4. These results provide evidence that shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance increases bank insolvency risk more in countries with strong public finances.  
Taken together, the results of Table 4 and Panels A of Table 5 suggest that ‘good’ 
corporate governance will increase risk taking especially at banks that are both large and 
located in countries with sound public finances. To test this, the regressions in Panel B of 
Table 5 include interactions of corporate governance variables with the assets variable, 
interactions of corporate governance variables with the fiscal balance variable, and triple 
interactions of corporate governance, assets and fiscal balance variables. In the Z-score 
regression 1, the triple interaction involving the overall corporate governance index has a 
negative and significant coefficient.  In the distance to default regression 3, this triple 
interaction variable also has a negative coefficient that is significant. In the regressions of 
Panel C of Table 5, we replace the assets variable by the big bank variable, again yielding 
negative and significant coefficients for the triple interaction variables in regressions 1 
and 3. Overall, these results indicate that shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
increases risk taking at large banks located in countries with sound public finances that 
are in a position to engage in risk-shifting towards the financial safety net.   
 
B. Endogeneity 
We recognize that corporate governance may to some extent be endogenously 
determined. For instance, a strong preference for risk on the part of a bank’s shareholders 
may jointly give rise to both considerable bank risk taking and shareholder-friendly 
corporate governance. To alleviate concerns about endogeneity, we include bank fixed 
effects in all regressions in the paper, thereby controlling for any time-invariant 
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unobservable bank characteristics that affect both bank corporate governance and bank 
risk. Going beyond this, we analyze the relationship between corporate governance and 
bank insolvency risk using an instrumental variables approach. In particular, we 
instrument for a bank’s corporate governance variables by using the country and year 
averages of these variables for all banks in the country excluding the bank itself.  
Country-year averages are good instruments to use, because a shock to the risk of one 
bank is unlikely to affect the corporate governance of other banks.  This IV approach was 
previously used by John, Litov, and Yeung, 2008, Aggarwal et al., 2009 and Laeven and 
Levine, 2009. The IV results, reported in Table 6, are very similar to those reported in 
Table 3. Specifically, the Z-score and the distance to default are negatively related to the 
overall corporate governance index in regressions 1 and 3.The IV regressions thus 
provide additional evidence that shareholder-friendly corporate governance increased 
bank insolvency risk over the sample period covering the years 2004-2008. 
C. Bank risk strategies 
A bank’s Z-score and its distance to default are summary measures that reflect a 
range of bank risk-related strategies associated with its asset allocation, income mix, and 
capitalization and funding strategy. Next, we consider the impact of corporate 
governance on a range of indicators that reflect a bank’s broader risk strategy. To start, 
Table 7 reports results on the associations between a bank’s asset and income strategies 
and indices of corporate governance. In regression 1, the asset volatility variable is 
positively and significantly related to the overall corporate governance index, while in 
regression 2 it is positively and significantly related to the board variable. This indicates 
that more shareholder-friendly corporate governance is associated with more asset risk. In 
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regression 4, the assets risk weight variable is positively and significantly related to the 
board and takeover variables, but it is negatively and significantly related to the auditing 
index. The latter result could mean that shareholder-friendly auditing regimes lead banks 
to take on less asset risk, or alternatively that they cause the bank to manipulate 
downward the reported asset risk weight.  
 Regressions 5 and 6 relate the loans variable to corporate governance indices. 
This variable is positively and significantly related to the takeover variable in regression 
6, providing some evidence that banks with shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
regimes allocate a larger share of their assets to loans which are expected to be relatively 
risky. 
 Next, we find that the loan loss provisioning variable is positively and 
significantly related to the overall corporate governance index in regression 7, while it is 
positively and significantly related to the board and auditing subindices in regression 8, 
suggesting that banks with shareholder-friendly corporate governance provider riskier 
loans.  
 Finally, we see in regressions 9 and 10 that the fee income variable is not 
significantly related to the corporate governance indices.  
 Overall, we find some evidence that asset risk, and in particular loan performance 
risk, is positively associated with shareholder-friendly corporate governance. 
 Next, we consider whether corporate governance is associated with risky 
capitalization, funding and growth strategies. In regression 1 of Table 8, the tangible 
capital ratio is negatively and significantly related to the overall corporate governance 
index, and in regression 2 it is negatively and significantly related to the board index. 
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This provides some evidence that bank capitalization is negatively related to shareholder-
friendly corporate governance.
5
 We do not find that the non-deposit funding variable is 
significantly related to corporate governance variables in regressions 3 and 4, while also 
the assets growth variable is not significantly related to corporate governance in 
regressions 5 and 6. The finding that a bank’s intangible equity is negatively associated 
with shareholder-friendly corporate governance is in line with our earlier finding that 
bank insolvency risk is positively related to shareholder-friendly corporate governance. 
D. Banking procyclicality 
 Next, we consider how corporate governance affects the cyclicality of bank 
lending and other proxies of bank-risk taking. Banks with shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance may take on additional risk by expanding credit during economic booms. To 
test this, we relate the lending procyclicality variable, which is the correlation between 
bank loan growth and GDP growth, to the overall corporate governance index in 
regression 1 of Table 9. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant at 10%, 
providing some evidence that lending is more procyclical at banks with greater 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance. However, none of the individual corporate 
governance subindices obtain significant coefficients.  
Similar to the analyses described above, we also calculate correlation coefficients 
between non-performing loans and GDP growth and  tangible capital ratio and GDP 
growth, and estimate similar procyclicality regressions as reported in columns 1 and 2. 
We obtain significant results for regressions of non-performing loans procyclicality and 
tangible equity procyclicality reported in Table 9. Specifically, in regression 3 the non-
                                                          
5
 Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, Huizinga and Ma (2013) consider in detail how board-related and takeover-
related corporate governance features and executive compensation affect capitalization strategies for an 
international sample of banks over the 2003-2011 period.  
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performing loans procyclicality variable is negatively and significantly related to the 
overall corporate governance variable.  In regression 4 it is negatively and significantly 
related to the board subindex. Banks with greater shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance report less non-performing loans during economic booms. This may reflect 
the fact that these banks manipulate the reporting of non-performing loans downward in 
order to preserve capital and continue to be able to expand credit. In regression 5 and 6, 
we see that the tangible equity procyclicality variable is negatively and significantly 
related to the overall corporate governance index and the board index. That is, banks with 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance reduce their tangible capital ratio more during 
economic upswings, probably due to large credit expansion during these periods. Overall, 
we find that banks with shareholder-friendly corporate governance expand credit more 
during economic booms, and that they tend to reduce the reporting of non-performing 
loans and to reduce tangible equity. 
E. The valuation of the implicit insurance offered by the financial safety net 
 Higher bank insolvency risk is beneficial to bank shareholders to the extent that 
this increases the valuation of the implicit insurance provided by the financial safety net. 
The IPP variable is an estimate of the value of this insurance, measured as cents per 
dollar of total bank liabilities over a one-year horizon. In Table 10, we report regressions 
of IPP on corporate governance indices, the assets variable and their interactions, 
analogously to the bank insolvency risk regressions of Table 4. In regression 1, IPP is 
positively and significantly related to the overall corporate governance variable, which 
suggests that banks with shareholder-friendly corporate governance engage in more risk-
shifting towards the financial safety net. In regression 2, we interact corporate 
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governance with assets.  The interaction term is positive and significant. This is 
consistent with large banks with shareholder-friendly corporate governance engaging in 
greater risk-shifting. Similarly, the board, auditing and takeover indices are estimated 
with negative and significant coefficients in regression 3, and the interaction of the board 
and assets variables is estimated with a positive and significant coefficient in regression 4.  
The results of Tables 4 and 7 together suggest that large banks with ‘good’ corporate 
governance are able to shift risk on the financial safety by increasing their insolvency risk.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that more shareholder-friendly corporate governance is  
associated with increased bank insolvency risk, as proxied by the bank Z-score and the 
market based distance to default variables. This empirical relationship is robust to 
including bank fixed effects and instrumental variable estimation, alleviating endogeneity 
concerns. We further find that ‘good’ corporate governance is associated with increased 
asset volatility, more non-performing loans, and a lower tangible equity ratio.  
 Our findings that ‘good’ corporate governance is associated with increased risk 
taking at financial firms are consistent with earlier research showing that better investor 
protection reduces excessive risk-avoidance at non-financial firms explained by the fact 
that managers earn private benefits from reducing risk. Banks, however, are special in 
that they benefit from the financial safety net. The financial safety net provides banks 
with an incentive to take on too much risk, as banks receive financial support from the 
financial safety if they become distressed.  
22 
 
This suggests that risk taking at banks is determined by the interaction of 
corporate governance regimes and the financial safety net. We find empirical support for 
this hypothesis by showing that ‘good’ corporate governance increases bank risk taking 
especially for banks that are large and located in countries with strong public finances. 
For these banks, more risk can be expected to increase their contingent claim on the 
financial safety net. ‘Good’ corporate governance thus reinforces the tendency for banks 
to exploit the financial safety net, if they are in a position to do so. 
Consistent with our results on bank risk taking, we find that ‘good’ corporate 
governance is associated with a higher valuation of the implicit insurance offered by the 
financial safety net especially in the case of large banks. This reflects that large banks 
have a relatively strong incentive to increase the value of the implicit insurance, as they 
stand a much better chance to collect on the insurance given their too-big-to-fail status. 
The interaction of corporate governance and the financial safety net in 
determining bank insolvency risk has important implications for public policy towards 
corporate governance at large banks. In particular, the case for more shareholder-friendly 
corporate governance at banks is much weaker than in the case of non-financial firms. In 
the case of banks, particularly large ones, ‘better’ corporate governance may only 
exacerbate the excessive risk taking resulting from the banks’ incentives to exploit the 
financial safety net. In the second-best world where mispriced financial safety nets and 
too-big-to-fail policies exist, ‘better’ corporate governance thus may actually produce 
worse outcomes. To prevent this, a first priority should be regulatory and safety net 
reform to address too-big-to-fail issues and reduce moral hazard leading to excess risk 
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taking of banks. Only after these reforms, the case for ‘better’ corporate governance at 
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A1. The distance to default and IPP 
We follow Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004) and Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) in calculating Merton’s (1974) distance to default.  The 
market equity value of a company is modeled as a call option on the company’s assets:  
       
    (  )    
    (  )  (   
   )   
   
   (
  




  √ 
         √  
(A1) 
where    is the market value of a bank,    is the value of the bank’s assets, X is the face 
value of debt maturing at time T, r is the risk free rate, d is the dividend rate expressed in 
terms of   , and where N(xi) is the probability that x ≤ xi given that x is distributed with 
zero mean and unit variance.     is the volatility of the value of assets, which is related to 
equity volatility through the following equation: 
 
   
   
    (  )  
  
       (A2) 
We simultaneously solve equations (A1) and (A2) to find the values of    and   . 
We use the market value of equity for    and total liabilities to proxy for the face value 
of debt, X.  Since the accounting information is on an annual basis, we linearly interpolate 
the values for all dates over the period, using end of year values for accounting items. 
The interpolation method has the advantage of producing a smooth implied asset value 
process and avoids jumps in the implied default probabilities at year end.    is the 
standard deviation of daily equity returns over the past 12 months. In calculating standard 
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deviations, we require the company to have at least 90 non-zero and non-missing returns 
over the previous 12 months. T equals one year, and r is the one-year Treasury bill rate, 
which we take to be the risk-free rate. The dividend rate, d, is the sum of the prior year’s 
common and preferred dividends divided by the market value of assets. We use the 
Newton method to simultaneously solve the two equations above. For starting values of 
the unknown variables, we use VA = VE + X and sA = sEVE/(VE+X).  After we determine 
asset values VA, we follow Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) and assign asset return 
m to be equal to the equity premium given by 6%.
6
 Merton’s (1974) distance to default is 
finally computed as:  
 
                    
   (
  
 )  (    
  
 
 )  
  √ 
 
(A3) 
Following Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven (2000) and Bushman and Williams 
(2012), we estimate IPP as the value of a put option on bank liabilities as follows: 
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  √ 
) (A4) 
In the empirical work, IPP is expressed as the value of the put option per dollar of 
bank liabilities in cents. 
  
                                                          
6
 We obtain similar distance to default values if we compute the asset return as    (
    
      
    )following 
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004). 
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A2. Variable definitions, data sources, governance attributes, and country coverage 
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable name Definition Data source 
Risk and return 
variables 
  
Z-score Index of bank solvency constructed as the logarithm of (E(ROA) + 
CAR)/SROA  where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents 
capital assets ratio and SROA stands for standard deviation of return 
on assets 
BankScope 
Distance to default 
 
Annual average of distance-to-default based on stock based on stock 
price variability 
Authors’ calculation 
Asset volatility  Annualized standard deviation of the asset return implicit in 
Merton’s option pricing model 
Authors’ calculation 
Asset risk weight Risk weighted assets divided by total asset BankScope 
Loans Loans divided by total assets BankScope 
Non-performing loans Non-performing loans divided by gross loans outstanding BankScope 
Fee income Share of non-interest income in total operating income BankScope 
Tangible capital 
 
Ratio of tangible capital to tangible assets BankScope 
Non-deposit funding Share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits and short-
term funding 
BankScope 
Asset growth Growth rate of total assets BankScope 
Lending procyclicality Correlation coefficient between loan growth rate and GDP growth 
rate 
BankScope 
IPP Fair value of the insurance put option per dollar of liabilities in 
cents 
Authors’ calculation 
Governance variables   
Corporate governance  Overall corporate governance index ISS 
Board  Corporate governance index based on board characteristics ISS 
Compensation and 
ownership 
Corporate governance index based on compensation and ownership 
characteristics 
ISS 
Auditing Corporate governance index based on auditing characteristics ISS 
Takeover Corporate governance index based on takeover characteristics ISS 
Bank control variables 
Assets Logarithm of total assets BankScope 
Big bank Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank’s assets exceed 50 billion 
dollars, and zero otherwise. 
BankScope 
Assets to GDP Total assets divided by GDP  BankScope 
Overhead Overhead divided by total assets BankScope 
Collateral Assets that can be used as collateral (securities, cash and due from 
other banks, and fixed assets) divided by total assets 
BankScope 
Macro and institutional control variables 
Inflation Consumer price inflation rate World Development 
Indicators 
GDP growth Rate of real GDP growth World Development 
Indicators 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2005 U.S. dollars World Development 
Indicators 
Fiscal balance Government budget balance as a percentage of GDP World Development 
Indicators 
Restrict Index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities  Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2004) 
Capital stringency Index of regulatory oversight of bank, ranging from 3 to 10 with 
higher values indicate greater stringency  
Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2004) 
Official Index of power of commercial bank supervisory agency. It measures 
the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to 
prevent and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater 





Diversification Index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 
0 to 2 with higher values indicating more diversification. 
Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2004) 
Financial freedom Index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values 







Table A2. Corporate governance attributes  
Board attributes 
1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse 
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies 
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors 
4. Board size is greater than 5 but less than 16 
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction 
6. No former CEO on the board 
7. Compensation committee composed solely of independent outsiders 
8. Chairman and CEO are separated or there is a lead director 
9.Nominating committee composed solely of independent outsiders 
10.Governance committee exists and met in the past year 
11.Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies 
12.Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed 
13.Annually elected board (no staggered board) 
14.Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit) 
15.Shareholders have cumulative voting rights 
16.Shareholder approval is required to increase/decrease board size 
17.Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws 
18.Board has the express authority to hire its own advisors 
19.Performance of the board is reviewed regularly 
20.Board-approved succession plan in place for the CEO 
21.Outside directors meet without CEO and disclose number of times met 
22.Directors are required to submit resignation upon a change in job 
23.Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can do so only under limited circumstances 
24.Does not ignore shareholder proposal 
25.Qualifies for proxy contest defenses combination points 
Compensation and ownership attributes 
26.Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements 
27.Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines 
28.No interlocks among compensation committee members 
29.Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock 
30.All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval 
31.Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate 
32.Company expenses stock options 
33.All directors with more than one year of service own stock 
34.Officers' and directors' stock ownership is at least 1% but not over 30% of total shares outstanding 
35.Repricing is prohibited 
Auditing attributes 
36.Board independence: Audit committee 
37.Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors 
38.Auditors ratified at most recent annual meeting 
Antitakeover attributes 
39.Single class, common 
40.Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority)  
41.Shareholders may call special meetings 
42.Shareholder may act by written consent 
43.Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved 
44.Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred 









Country name Frequency Percent 
Australia 35 1.14 
Austria 8 0.26 
Belgium 18 0.59 
Canada 44 1.44 
Denmark 8 0.26 
France 14 0.46 
Germany 38 1.24 
Greece 26 0.85 
Hong Kong 44 1.44 
Ireland 15 0.49 
Italy 41 1.34 
Japan 264 8.61 
Korea Republic of 2 0.07 
Netherlands 15 0.49 
Norway 2 0.07 
Portugal 15 0.49 
Singapore 19 0.62 
Spain 18 0.59 
Sweden 20 0.65 
Switzerland 20 0.65 
United Kingdom 65 2.12 
United States  2,334 76.15 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Z-score is an index of bank solvency constructed as the logarithm of (E(ROA) + CAR)/SROA where ROA is return on 
assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SRO. Distance to default is the annual average of distance to default 
based on stock price variability. Asset volatility is the annualized standard deviation of the asset return implicit in 
Merton’s option pricing model. Asset risk is risk weighted assets divided by total assets. Loans is total loans divided by 
total assets. Non-performing loans is non-performing loans divided by gross loans outstanding. Fee income is the share 
of non-interest income in total operating income. Tangible capital is the ratio of tangible capital to tangible assets. Non-
deposit funding is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits and short-term funding. Asset growth is 
the growth rate of total assets. Lending procyclicality is the correlation coefficient between loan growth rate and GDP 
growth rate. IPP is the fair value of the insurance put option per dollar of liabilities in cents. Corporate governance is an 
overall corporate governance index. Board is a corporate governance index based on board characteristics. 
Compensation and ownership a corporate governance index based on compensation and ownership characteristics. 
Auditing is a corporate governance index based on auditing characteristics. Takeover is a corporate governance index 
based on takeover characteristics. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Big bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
bank’s assets exceed 50 billion dollars, and zero otherwise. Assets to GDP is total assets divided by GDP. Overhead is 
overhead divided by total assets. Collateral is assets that can easily be used as collateral divided by total assets. 
Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the rate of real GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per 
capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Fiscal balance is the government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. 
Restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory oversight 
of bank capital, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of power of 
commercial bank supervisory agency. It measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to 
prevent and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater power. Diversification is an index of diversification 
guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating more diversification. Financial freedom 
is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom.   
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Z-score 3209 4.184962 1.093369 -0.9347929 8.550281 
Distance to default 3244 6.285612 1.954979 1.249333 12 
Asset volatility 2858 0.048106 0.035787 0.003987 0.402628 
Asset risk weight 2307 0.6973368 0.1499069 0.0840349 0.9988244 
Loans 3149 0.703366 0.201349 0 1 
Non-performing loans 3072 0.0116643 0.0174703 0 0.1 
Fee income 3371 0.3023819 0.2061754 0 1 
Tangible capital 3372 0.0776388 0.0422173 0 0.3997 
Non-deposit funding 3418 0.1670455 0.2600481 0 1.004587 
Asset growth 3387 0.0746193 0.1331773 -0.6931472 0.6931472 
Lending procyclicality 3381 0.0969869 0.417961 -1 1 
IPP 2858 0.0428959 0.1250289 0  1.458718 
Corporate governance  3627 25.03364 3.598887 15 39 
Board  3627 12.87869 2.673573 6 21 
Compensation and ownership 3627 6.25834 1.15688 3 10 
Auditing 3627 2.241798 0.7190849 0 3 
Takeover 3627 3.654811 1.124837 0 6 
Assets 3412 8.332414 2.270508 1.386294 14.85713 
Big bank 3412 0.1769499 0.3816819 0 1 
Assets to GDP 3412 0.0615769 0.2448429 3.39E-07 2.790281 
Overhead 3399 0.033921 0.0522931 0.0007951 0.8771428 
Collateral 3411 0.268855 0.1520512 0.0051394 0.9978418 
Inflation 3614 0.0253839 0.0093389 -0.025 0.0487992 
GDP growth 3627 0.0275575 0.0096054 -0.0091112 0.091591 
GDP per capita 3627 40.79125 4.983224 17.95289 81.3538 
Fiscal balance 3564 -2.689619 1.823869 -7.350887 18.37307 
Restrict 3614 7.65689 1.120296 3 9 
Capital stringency 3614 4.957665 0.6045594 2 8 
Official 3614 12.40786 1.538042 5 14 
Diversification 3614 1.429441 0.505028 0 2 





Table 2. Correlations among corporate governance variables 
 
This table presents pair-wise correlations between corporate governance variables. Corporate governance is 
an overall corporate governance index. Board is a corporate governance index based on board 
characteristics. Compensation and ownership a corporate governance index based on compensation and 
ownership characteristics. Auditing is a corporate governance index based on auditing characteristics. 
Takeover is a corporate governance index based on takeover characteristics. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Corporate governance Board 
Compensation  
and ownership Auditing Takeover 
Corporate governance  1 
    Board  0.908*** 1 
   Compensation and ownership 0.570*** 0.378*** 1 
  Auditing 0.388*** 0.252*** 0.144*** 1 





Table 3. Bank insolvency risk and corporate governance 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the z-score, and the dependent variable in column 3 and 4 is 
the distance to default. Z-score is an index of bank solvency constructed as the logarithm of (E(ROA) + 
CAR)/SROA where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio and SRO. Distance to 
default is the annual average of distance to default based on stock price variability. Assets is the logarithm 
of total assets. Assets to GDP is total assets divided by GDP. Overhead is overhead divided by total assets. 
Collateral is assets that can easily be used as collateral divided by total assets. Inflation is the consumer 
price inflation rate. GDP growth is the rate of real GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in 
thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Capital 
stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher values 
indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of power of commercial bank supervisory agency. It 
measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems, 
with higher values indicating greater power. Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines 
imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating more diversification. Corporate 
governance is an overall corporate governance index. Board is a corporate governance index based on 
board characteristics. Compensation and ownership a corporate governance index based on compensation 
and ownership characteristics. Auditing is a corporate governance index based on auditing characteristics. 
Takeover is a corporate governance index based on takeover characteristics. Financial freedom is an index 
of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom.  Regressions 
include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and 






Distance to default 
(3) 
Distance to default 
(4) 
Assets -0.493*** -0.486*** -0.039 -0.046 
 
(0.185) (0.184) (0.199) (0.200) 
Assets to GDP -1.224* -1.146* -0.736 -0.703 
 
(0.680) (0.660) (0.805) (0.804) 
Overhead -1.088 -0.872 -0.968 -0.860 
 
(1.984) (1.974) (2.112) (2.116) 
Collateral -0.560 -0.566 -0.486 -0.516 
 
(0.459) (0.457) (0.563) (0.561) 
Inflation 16.776*** 16.538*** 24.233*** 23.809*** 
 
(4.905) (4.901) (8.878) (8.897) 
GDP growth 2.058 2.005 -3.673 -3.893 
 
(8.242) (8.210) (12.470) (12.519) 
GDP per capita -0.216** -0.214** -0.176 -0.182 
 
(0.091) (0.091) (0.137) (0.136) 
Restrict 0.002 0.014 -0.399** -0.393** 
 
(0.141) (0.141) (0.171) (0.171) 
Capital stringency -0.006 -0.009 0.131 0.130 
 
(0.089) (0.088) (0.100) (0.100) 
Official 0.002 -0.005 -0.031 -0.028 
 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.051) (0.052) 
Diversification 0.543*** 0.513*** -0.767*** -0.736*** 
 
(0.110) (0.108) (0.122) (0.125) 
Financial freedom 0.012** 0.011** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Corporate governance  -0.027** 
 
-0.029** 








































N 3085 3085 2934 2934 
adj. R-sq 0.209 0.210 0.563 0.563 
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Table 4. Bank insolvency risk, bank size and corporate governance 
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the z-score which is an index of bank solvency constructed as 
the logarithm of (E(ROA) + CAR)/SROA where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio 
and SRO. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the distance to default which is the distance to 
default based on stock price variability. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Big bank is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a bank’s assets exceed 50 billion dollars, and zero otherwise. Assets to GDP is total 
assets divided by GDP. Overhead is overhead divided by total assets. Collateral is assets that can easily be 
used as collateral divided by total assets. Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the 
rate of real GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Restrict is 
an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory oversight 
of bank capital, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of 
power of commercial bank supervisory agency. It measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take 
specific actions to prevent and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater power. 
Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher 
values indicating more diversification. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 
100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. Corporate governance is an overall corporate 
governance index. Board is a corporate governance index based on board characteristics. Compensation 
and ownership a corporate governance index based on compensation and ownership characteristics. 
Auditing is a corporate governance index based on auditing characteristics. Takeover is a corporate 
governance index based on takeover characteristics. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, 
scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. Panel A includes the interaction 
between corporate governance indices and bank assets. Whereas panel B constitutes a robustness check 
where we replace assets by the big bank dummy. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. 
Regressions include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank 
level, and provided in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  





Distance to default 
(3) 
Distance to default 
(4) 
Assets -0.364 -0.278 0.837*** 0.807*** 
 
(0.227) (0.233) (0.251) (0.258) 
Assets to GDP -1.122 -1.155* -0.139 -0.042 
 
(0.691) (0.664) (0.846) (0.879) 
Overhead -1.021 -0.936 -0.602 -0.365 
 
(1.982) (1.994) (2.055) (2.066) 
Collateral -0.534 -0.548 -0.348 -0.377 
 
(0.460) (0.454) (0.560) (0.562) 
Inflation 16.990*** 16.734*** 24.655*** 23.893*** 
 
(4.902) (4.932) (9.022) (8.990) 
GDP growth 2.077 3.868 -1.761 -2.579 
 
(8.206) (8.235) (12.636) (12.626) 
GDP per capita -0.218** -0.200** -0.195 -0.210 
 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.137) (0.138) 
Restrict -0.007 0.014 -0.439** -0.428** 
 
(0.142) (0.144) (0.174) (0.174) 
Capital stringency 0.002 0.014 0.182* 0.172* 
 
(0.090) (0.090) (0.099) (0.100) 
Official -0.002 -0.012 -0.062 -0.063 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.051) (0.052) 
Diversification 0.549*** 0.458*** -0.738*** -0.688*** 
 
(0.110) (0.104) (0.125) (0.129) 
Financial freedom 0.013** 0.009* 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Corporate governance  0.016 
 
0.258*** 
   (0.047) 
 
(0.052) 


















































































N 3085 3085 2934 2934 
adj. R-sq 0.209 0.212 0.571 0.572 
Panel B 
Big bank 0.018 0.213 1.553** 2.139** 
 
(0.691) (0.776) (0.755) (0.952) 
Corporate governance  -0.026* 
 
-0.015 
   (0.014) 
 
(0.015) 
















































































N 3085 3085 2934 2934 




Table 5. Bank insolvency risk, the fiscal balance and corporate governance 
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the z-score which is an index of bank solvency constructed as 
the logarithm of (E(ROA) + CAR)/SROA where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets 
ratio and SRO. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the distance to default which is the distance to 
default based on stock price variability. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is the return on assets 
which is pre-tax profits divided by assets. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Big bank is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a bank’s assets exceed 50 billion dollars, and zero otherwise. Assets to GDP is total 
assets divided by GDP. Overhead is overhead divided by total assets. Collateral is assets that can easily be 
used as collateral divided by total assets. Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the 
rate of real GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Restrict is 
an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory oversight 
of bank capital, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of 
power of commercial bank supervisory agency. It measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take 
specific actions to prevent and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater power. 
Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher 
values indicating more diversification. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 
100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. Fiscal balance is the government budget balance as a 
percentage of GDP. Corporate governance is an overall corporate governance index. Board is a corporate 
governance index based on board characteristics. Compensation and ownership a corporate governance 
index based on compensation and ownership characteristics. Auditing is a corporate governance index 
based on auditing characteristics. Takeover is a corporate governance index based on takeover 
characteristics. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values 
indicating greater freedom. Panel A includes interaction of corporate governance indices and the fiscal 
balance of the country where the bank is incorporated. Panel B and C include triple interactions of 
corporate governance indices, the fiscal balance, and bank size measured by the assets and big bank 
variables, respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Regressions include bank and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses.  *, 
**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 











Assets -0.337* -0.330* -0.004 -0.033 
 
(0.181) (0.180) (0.201) (0.200) 
Assets to GDP -0.442 -0.409 -0.172 -0.109 
 
(0.665) (0.659) (0.889) (0.908) 
Overhead -0.424 -0.297 -0.645 -0.662 
 
(1.882) (1.882) (1.983) (2.016) 
Collateral -0.822* -0.835* -0.634 -0.673 
 
(0.464) (0.460) (0.571) (0.571) 
Inflation 19.801*** 19.592*** 16.287* 15.796* 
 
(4.874) (4.976) (9.178) (9.020) 
GDP growth 4.944 4.099 -20.199* -17.734 
 
(8.725) (8.810) (11.962) (12.076) 
GDP per capita -0.111 -0.101 -0.195 -0.218 
 
(0.103) (0.105) (0.160) (0.162) 
Restrict 0.091 0.092 -0.384** -0.342** 
 
(0.122) (0.124) (0.166) (0.166) 
Capital stringency -0.062 -0.076 0.115 0.130 
 
(0.085) (0.087) (0.100) (0.101) 
Official -0.054 -0.051 -0.051 -0.046 
 
(0.039) (0.040) (0.055) (0.056) 
Diversification 0.136 0.168 -0.865*** -0.877*** 
 
(0.097) (0.104) (0.144) (0.147) 
Financial freedom 0.012** 0.013** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Fiscal balance 0.085 0.120 0.776*** 0.726*** 
 
(0.143) (0.164) (0.191) (0.200) 
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N 3001 3001 2855 2855 
adj. R-sq 0.218 0.218 0.577 0.579 
 Panel B 
Assets 0.378 0.257 -0.399* -0.340 
 
(0.268) (0.269) (0.233) (0.241) 
Fiscal balance 0.413** 0.633*** 0.041 -0.030 
 
(0.208) (0.242) (0.153) (0.181) 



















































































































































































N 2855 2855 3001 3001 
adj. R-sq 0.595 0.598 0.220 0.223 
Panel C 
Big Bank -0.695 -0.658 -1.372** -1.313* 
 
(0.983) (1.143) (0.644) (0.786) 
Fiscal balance 0.716*** 0.665*** 0.122 0.050 
 
(0.200) (0.238) (0.149) (0.183) 

















































































































































































N 2855 2855 3001 3001 





Table 6. Bank insolvency risk and corporate governance: IV estimation 
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the z-score which is index of bank solvency constructed as 
the logarithm of (E(ROA) + CAR)/SROA where ROA is return on assets, CAR represents capital assets 
ratio and SRO. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Assets to GDP is total assets divided by GDP. 
Overhead is overhead divided by total assets. Collateral is assets that can easily be used as collateral 
divided by total assets. Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the rate of real GDP 
growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Restrict is an index of 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of bank 
capital, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of power of 
commercial bank supervisory agency. It measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific 
actions to prevent and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater power. Diversification is an 
index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating 
more diversification. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher 
values indicating greater freedom. Corporate governance variables are instrumented by country and year 
averages of the same variables excluding the pertinent bank. The estimation is carried out with two-stage 




 stage regressions include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at 












Assets  -0.489** -0.429* -0.003 -0.108 
 
(0.195) (0.238) (0.232) (0.261) 
Assets to GDP -0.897 -1.446* -0.803 -0.762 
 
(0.740) (0.785) (1.044) (1.115) 
Overhead -1.150 0.852 -0.727 -0.314 
 
(2.335) (2.732) (2.561) (3.058) 
Collateral -0.697 -0.498 -0.857 -1.211 
 
(0.527) (0.667) (0.674) (0.755) 
Inflation 13.609*** 14.156** 17.046 11.769 
 
(5.017) (5.588) (10.588) (12.245) 
GDP growth rate 8.794 14.663 17.134 19.077 
 
(8.898) (11.109) (14.954) (17.579) 
GDP per capita -0.184* -0.059 -0.185 -0.215 
 
(0.097) (0.130) (0.152) (0.165) 
Restrict -0.078 -0.035 -0.597*** -0.611*** 
 
(0.161) (0.212) (0.186) (0.205) 
Capital stringency 0.089 0.235 0.360*** 0.428** 
 
(0.110) (0.152) (0.120) (0.170) 
Official -0.006 0.012 -0.057 0.008 
 
(0.047) (0.062) (0.061) (0.080) 
Diversification 0.484*** 0.024 -0.960*** -0.596** 
 
(0.103) (0.207) (0.153) (0.282) 
Financial freedom 0.015*** -0.021* 0.026*** 0.021 
 
(0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.021) 
Corporate governance  -0.177*** 
 
-0.316*** 








































N 3008 3008 2849 2849 
adj. R-sq -0.131 -0.653 0.280 0.137 
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Table 7. Channels through which corporate governance can affect bank risk: asset and income choices 
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is asset volatility which is the annualized standard deviation of the asset return implied by Merton’s option pricing 
model. Morton’s option pricing model. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is asset risk weight which is risk weighted assets divided by total assets. The 
dependent variable in column 5 and 6 is loans which is loans divided by total assets. The dependent variable in columns 7 and 8 is non-performing loans which is 
non-performing loans divided by gross loans outstanding. The dependent variable in columns 9 and 10 is fee income which is the share of non-interest income in 
total operating income. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Assets to GDP is total assets divided by GDP. Overhead is overhead divided by total assets. 
Collateral is assets that can easily be used as collateral divided by total assets. Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the rate of real GDP 
growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Capital 
stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of power of 
commercial bank supervisory agency. It measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems, with higher 
values indicating greater power. Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating 
more diversification. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. Corporate 
governance is an overall corporate governance index. Board is a corporate governance index based on board characteristics. Compensation and ownership a 
corporate governance index based on compensation and ownership characteristics. Auditing is a corporate governance index based on auditing characteristics. 
Takeover is a corporate governance index based on takeover characteristics. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher 
values indicating greater freedom.  All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Regressions include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted 






























Assets -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.004 -0.003 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.026** -0.027** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) 
Assets to GDP 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.065 0.070 -0.001 -0.002 -0.037 -0.040 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.050) (0.009) (0.009) (0.056) (0.056) 
Overhead 0.095 0.093 0.374* 0.390* 0.272 0.280 0.085 0.081 0.560** 0.555** 
 
(0.099) (0.098) (0.227) (0.226) (0.281) (0.279) (0.075) (0.073) (0.272) (0.270) 
Collateral 0.008 0.007 -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.352*** -0.353*** 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.026) (0.059) (0.059) (0.011) (0.011) (0.034) (0.034) 
Inflation -0.480*** -0.483*** 0.430 0.445 0.444 0.423 0.049 0.042 -0.940 -0.921 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.336) (0.329) (0.500) (0.501) (0.136) (0.133) (0.622) (0.635) 
GDP growth -0.024 -0.027 0.058 0.066 -0.148 -0.158 -0.472*** -0.467*** -0.686* -0.678* 
 
(0.273) (0.273) (0.325) (0.321) (0.327) (0.326) (0.063) (0.064) (0.361) (0.361) 
GDP per capita 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.004** -0.004** 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
Restrict -0.001 -0.001 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.014* -0.014* 
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 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
Capital stringency 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) 
Official 0.003** 0.003** -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Diversification 0.007* 0.008** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.012* -0.013* -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.011 0.011 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) 
Financial freedom -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corporate governance 0.001**  0.000 
 
0.001  0.001*** 
 
-0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.001) 
 
(0.001)  (0.000) 
 
(0.001)  
Board  0.001** 
 
0.001*  0.001 
 
0.001***  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.001)  (0.001) 
 
(0.000)  (0.001) 
Compensation and 
ownership  -0.000 
 
-0.001  0.001 
 
-0.000  -0.001 
  (0.001) 
 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
 
(0.000)  (0.002) 
Auditing  0.002 
 
-0.005*  -0.001 
 
0.001**  0.000 
  (0.001) 
 
(0.003)  (0.002) 
 
(0.001)  (0.003) 
Takeover  0.001 
 
0.005*  0.007** 
 




(0.002)  (0.003) 
 
(0.001)  (0.004) 
N 3147 3147 2277 2277 3149 3149 2847 2847 3031 3031 




Table 8. Channels through which corporate governance can affect bank risk: liability and growth choices  
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is tangible capital which is the ratio of tangible capital to tangible assets. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 
is non-deposit funding which is the share of non-deposit short-term funding in total deposits and short-term funding. The dependent variable in columns 7 and 8 
is asset growth which is the growth rate of total assets. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Assets to GDP is total assets divided by GDP. Overhead is overhead 
divided by total assets. Collateral is assets that can easily be used as collateral divided by total assets. Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth 
is the rate of real GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank 
activities. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an 
index of power of commercial bank supervisory agency. It measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems, with higher values indicating greater power. Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher 
values indicating more diversification. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. 
Corporate governance is an overall corporate governance index. Board is a corporate governance index based on board characteristics. Compensation and 
ownership a corporate governance index based on compensation and ownership characteristics. Auditing is a corporate governance index based on auditing 
characteristics. Takeover is a corporate governance index based on takeover characteristics. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 
100 with higher values indicating greater freedom.  All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Regressions include bank and year fixed effects. Standard 

















Assets  -0.006* -0.006* 0.016 0.015 -0.372*** -0.373*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) 
Assets to GDP 0.013 0.014* -0.034 -0.039 0.169 0.171 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.054) (0.053) (0.117) (0.117) 
Overhead 0.095 0.098 0.515* 0.502* 0.440 0.438 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.289) (0.287) (0.345) (0.346) 
Collateral -0.018* -0.018* 0.034 0.034 0.139* 0.137* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.034) (0.034) (0.073) (0.073) 
Inflation 0.062 0.054 -0.618 -0.614 -1.416 -1.464 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.785) (0.783) (1.161) (1.159) 
GDP growth rate 0.064 0.059 0.006 0.014 0.319 0.279 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.511) (0.510) (0.687) (0.692) 
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.007 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Restrict 0.001 0.001 -0.023** -0.024** 0.007 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
Capital stringency 0.001 0.001 0.015* 0.015* -0.031** -0.032*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
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Official -0.001** -0.002** 0.001 0.001 -0.013* -0.012* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Diversification 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) 
Financial freedom 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Corporate governance  -0.000**  0.000 
 
-0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.001) 
 
(0.002) 















   (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) 
Auditing  -0.001  0.003  0.006 





Takeover  0.001 -0.003 0.005 





N 3091 3091 3131 3131 3156 3156 





Table 9. Banking procyclicality and corporate governance 
 
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is lending procyclicality is the correlation coefficient between GDP growth and a bank’s loan growth. The dependent 
variable in columns 3 and 4 is NPL procyclicality which is the correlation between GDP growth and non-performing loans as a fraction of total loan outstanding. 
The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is tangible capital procyclicality which is the correlation between GDP growth and tangible capital ratio. Assets is the 
logarithm of total assets. Assets to GDP is total assets divided by GDP. Overhead is overhead divided by total assets. Collateral is assets that can easily be used 
as collateral divided by total assets. Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the rate of real GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita 
in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of 
bank capital, ranging from 3 to 10 with higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of power of commercial bank supervisory agency. It 
measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater power. 
Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating more diversification. Financial 
freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, 
scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom. Corporate governance is an overall corporate governance index. Board is a corporate 
governance index based on board characteristics. Compensation and ownership a corporate governance index based on compensation and ownership 
characteristics. Auditing is a corporate governance index based on auditing characteristics. Takeover is a corporate governance index based on takeover 
characteristics. All explanatory variables  are mean values per bank. Regressions include country fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 








NPL   procyclicality 
(3) 








Assets -0.008 -0.007 -0.014* -0.017** -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Assets to GDP 0.103 0.094 -0.095* -0.069 -0.011 -0.004 
 
(0.076) (0.077) (0.053) (0.057) (0.061) (0.064) 
Overhead -0.317 -0.307 0.503 0.474 -0.459* -0.439* 
 
(0.739) (0.749) (0.656) (0.689) (0.238) (0.242) 
Collateral -0.296** -0.300** 0.426*** 0.425*** -0.133 -0.134 
 
(0.145) (0.145) (0.124) (0.124) (0.111) (0.112) 
Inflation -5.142** -5.681** 3.538* 3.772* -8.221*** -7.928*** 
 
(2.592) (2.724) (1.947) (1.998) (2.862) (2.945) 
GDP growth 15.388*** 15.635*** -19.751*** -21.788*** 9.975** 9.425* 
 
(4.198) (4.363) (4.254) (4.309) (4.929) (5.169) 
GDP per capita 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.005 0.008 0.007 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Restrict -0.079*** -0.077*** 0.025 0.028 -0.093*** -0.090*** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 




(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) 
Official 0.041** 0.040** -0.040** -0.041** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Diversification -0.017 0.001 0.149* 0.124 -0.089 -0.096 
 
(0.078) (0.082) (0.086) (0.089) (0.098) (0.101) 
Financial freedom -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
































































N 702 702 633 633 702 702 







Table 10. Implicit liability insurance, bank size and corporate governance 
 
The dependent variable is IPP, which is the fair value of the insurance put option per dollar of liabilities in 
cents. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Assets to GDP is total assets divided by GDP. Overhead is 
overhead divided by total assets. Collateral is assets that can easily be used as collateral divided by total 
assets. Inflation is the consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the rate of real GDP growth. GDP per 
capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. Restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions 
on bank activities. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, ranging from 3 to 
10 with higher values indicate greater stringency. Official is an index of power of commercial bank 
supervisory agency. It measures the power of the supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent 
and correct problems, with higher values indicating greater power. Diversification is an index of 
diversification guidelines imposed on banks, ranging from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating more 
diversification. Financial freedom is an index of financial freedom, scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values 
indicating greater freedom. Corporate governance is an overall corporate governance index. Board is a 
corporate governance index based on board characteristics. Compensation and ownership a corporate 
governance index based on compensation and ownership characteristics. Auditing is a corporate 
governance index based on auditing characteristics. Takeover is a corporate governance index based on 
takeover characteristics. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Regressions include bank and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses.  *, 










Assets  0.034* 0.000 0.033* -0.002 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) 
Assets to GDP -0.164*** -0.190*** -0.161*** -0.189*** 
 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061) 
Overhead 0.987 0.974 0.979 0.963 
 
(0.917) (0.913) (0.915) (0.912) 
Collateral -0.014 -0.019 -0.015 -0.021 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) 
GDP growth -2.732*** -2.749*** -2.775*** -2.799*** 
 
(0.495) (0.496) (0.494) (0.494) 
Inflation -0.453 -0.559 -0.504 -0.613 
 
(0.694) (0.699) (0.680) (0.686) 
GDP per capita -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Restrict -0.015* -0.013 -0.016* -0.014 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Capital stringency 0.013* 0.010 0.013* 0.010 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Official 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Diversification -0.011 -0.012* -0.009 -0.010 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Financial freedom -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Corporate governance  0.004*** -0.007* 
    (0.001) (0.004) 






  Board 
  
0.004*** -0.008 
   
(0.001) (0.005) 
Compensation and ownership 
  
0.001 -0.010 














Board * Assets 
   
0.001*** 
    
(0.001) 
Compensation and ownership * Assets 
   
0.001 
    
(0.001) 
Auditing * Assets 
   
0.001 
    
(0.002) 
Takeover * Assets 
   
0.001 
    
(0.002) 
N 2858 2858 2858 2858 




Figure 1. The evolution of governance finance variables  
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